This article elaborates on the current role of women in politics in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and concludes with perspectives for women’s participation in politics and leadership one another dream of the Chinese political elite, to achieve global leadership until 2049.
Figure 2: Dream Baby (梦娃). Source: People.com.cn (人民网), 2017.
Introduction
Winter 2016 in China, hardly any wall on the streets missed it out: a picture of a new icon, the “Dream Baby” (梦娃). This little girl resembled something great, a new Chinese dream.
With the State Presidency under Xi Jinping starting in 2013, the whole country has been gradually called upon to build its national dream, and the role of ‘Dream Baby’ was to lead the thoughts of masses with twelve keywords onto the road of the Chinese leadership: to dream of prosperity, democracy, civilization, harmony, freedom, equality, justice, rule of law, patriotism, dedication, integrity, and friendliness.[1]
In the light of the Chinese government’s political plans to rejuvenate its country, teach Marxism, and fight with ‘red genes’ towards global leadership[2], what would be the role of a girl to participate in it?
And could the Chinese dream become an ideal for women worldwide to share?
To answer these questions, this paper elaborates on the current role of women in politics in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and outlines perspectives for women’s participation in yet another dream of the Chinese political elite, to achieve global leadership until 2049.
Political background
The Chinese government under the leadership of President Xi has shifted a course from a former ‘Reform and Opening’ era under Deng Xiaoping to new times of ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’[3]. Exact definitions for this term are not given, but clear attributes to Communism and Marxism have been well documented in studies around the globe.[4]Since 2014, China’s government has presented one after another heavy-weight in strategic planning, including geopolitical projects like the Belt and Road Initiative[5] to globally connect China through infrastructure projects, or the ‘Made-in-China 2025’ to struggle for global innovation leadership until 2025. The latter is a first part of the ‘three ten-years projects’ developed to peak right before the PRC’s 100’s anniversary in 2049.[6] Certainly, from the perspective of China’s leaders, the centenary deserves great celebrations, and the Chinese Party leadership has no less in mind than to having achieved global leadership until then.[7]
What to expect from a global leadership by China, and what impact could it have on the role of women?
Old and new traditions
《长江后浪推前浪》
Chinese proverb, meaning that young generations are inspired and pushed by the power of the older ones.
While International Organisations aim to promote gender equality, fight against discrimination of women and struggle for their empowerment, China’s government has chosen a different path.
Following China’s intelligentsia today, orientation for future development lies in Marxist theories with elements of Mao Zedong’s thoughts. These old ideas under Xi’s presidency have found new ways into contemporary life in China. While younger Chinese[8] are less likely interested in political engagement, which could be concluded from an aging Communist Party in China (CCP)[9], both old and young happen to have something in common that China’s new Socialism era provides: a collective identity. Along with China’s digital boom, the internet offers sources of identity and ideological motivation to young generations[10], and all generations are addressed by public slogans, radio and television, newspapers, advertisement, educative measures and more to unite and jointly fight for a rejuvenation of China’s great nation with its own characteristics.
To rejuvenate China and recall thoughts of the past practically includes to remember historical family traditions in China, such as to seek for inspirations in solving today’s social problems in a modern version of Confucianism.[11] One of China’s social problems is its rapidly aging society. China’s one-child policy has controlled birth numbers for roughly 37 years and has only been lifted in 2015, resulting in fewer numbers of young people that need to take care of a growing number of the elderly and retired.[12] China’s classic Confucianist model sees women to take care of children and the elderly, not men. Could women emancipate from this traditional pressure facing today’s increasing social imbalances in China?
Women’s political participation in China
The old patriarchal Confucianist order that dominated family structures in China for centuries, in which women were subordinated to male (family) leaders and had little more roles but to care of a household, children, and the elderly, has been gradually weakened with the end of China’s Qing dynasty.[13] Instead, the CCP has promoted equality between men and women from 1949 onwards. Women’s active participation in labour, society, and also politics was supported along with the foundation of several institutions and associations to women help women to become productive at work and increase chances to realize dreams the CCP had under its Chairman Mao Zedong.[14]
The All-China Women’s Federation
The most prominent association evolving from the early liberalisation of women has been the All-China Women’s Federation (ACWF), until today the country’s top political representation of women’s interests.[15] While the ACWF rose to a powerful organisation under Deng’s Reform and Open-Door policies and stimulated women on village, town, city, or provincial levels to political participation, women’s rights and opportunities for equality also flourished. Alignments with international norms for equality and gender policy additionally promoted women’s empowerments.[16]
In 2015, the Chinese Central Committee (CCC) introduced a mass organisation reform. Today, the ACWF is a political organisation under the CCP that receives strong guidance from the propaganda department. Hence, opinions on the structure of the ACWF have split: one group is fearing that the ACWF will become more politicised in top ranks and therefore could lose grounds from its original target groups of representing female proletarians including its newly built social groups in the reform era, mixed with concerns that ‘representation of interests’ will increasingly be replaced by political top-down agendas.[17] This view is opposed by a second group that has long seen a threat in social freedom under the former ‘neo-liberal’ movement in China and now embraces modern state control and centralistic, strategic narratives.[18] The current ACWF President Shen just highlighted that it requires to ‘fully believe in the party’s leadership, the socialist system, and that the road to Socialism with Chinese characteristics is good. It is needed to continue to strengthen the political, ideological, theoretical, and emotional identification of the party’s innovative theories, always listen to the party, and firmly follow the party.’[19] This speech leaves no doubts about the direction of the AWCF and the subordination of women’s interests to the CCP.
China’s political elite on the role of women
China’s politics are largely dominated by men. According to its political elite, China is reportedly seeking ‘great unity for the world as its golden key to profoundly understand and fully grasp Xi Jinping’s thoughts on Socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era.’[20] It suggests that in a global struggle for political leadership, China’s solution would be global unity with ‘Chinese characteristics’. President Xi envisions a road to women’s liberation and development with distinctive Chinese characteristics, which needs to present a different value set and development paths of women against those of other countries. The Communist Party of China should have absolute superiority in its socialist system.[21] The interests of international communities and liberal societies have widely remained unaddressed in this nationalist ideology.
The role of women according to Xi is to produce new and greater Chinese dreams for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. Women’s federations at all levels should politically responsibly encourage women to listen to and follow the party, as well as to inspire women’s senses of historical responsibility.[22]
On the occasion of the International Women’s Day in 2021, China’s State news agency Xinhua praised the contributions of Mao’s leadership to the liberalisation of women and suggests letting oneself be guided by these ideas.[23]
Could China’s old political system under Mao, which ended in a social, national catastrophe in 1978, be a suitable model for a modern Chinese society that has experienced ongoing development of liberalisation for decades afterwards?
By promoting empowerment of women at the one hand, and by encouraging to revive old family traditions as ideals to overcome modern social problems, women in China are facing a paradox situation to either follow traditions and be family-carers or emancipate, but only within in a framework a male political elite sets for them to subordinate. After decades of liberalisation in China, women under the era of ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’ appear to have become victims to new forms of social and intellectual control, again.
Female facts in China’s power politics
Women in China’s political elite are qualitatively and quantitatively underrepresented. A quick check of representative and decision-making functions illustrates current imbalances of political power.
Representative functions
A quick check of the CCC’s gender structure online shows that out of the Who-is-who 371 top political functions in China, 30 seats were taken by women (9%) and 341 by men.[24]
Comparably well represented with 20% are women in China’s highest and most representative political organ, the current People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), which is organised in groups. The CPPCC’s current top 3 groups rated by percentage of women’s participation:
- 100% All-China Women’s Federation
- 47% Ethnic Minority League
- 43% All-China Federation of Taiwan Compatriots
However, women’s participation rates also rank lowest in important national development sectors like the Science and Tech Association (7% women) or the Economics Sector (8% women). [25] Among 24 leaders of the China’s CPPCC, only two women have top functions (4%). [26]
Decision-making functions
The highest organ of state power and national legislature in China is the National People’s Congress (NPC), in which 24% out of 2282 members are currently women.[27]
Who has decision power in the NPC? The Standing Committee is the most powerful body in the NPC with a share of 11% women of currently 170 members.[28]
Within the CCP’s highest organ of authority whenever the NPC is not in Plenary Session, out of the CCC’s total 204 seats for its full members ten are taken by women (5%)[29].
China’s CCP decision making body, the Politburo, counts in its Standing Committee seven members but no woman; among its 25 regular members, one woman (Sun Chunlan, 孙春兰) is part of the team.[30] Sun Chunlan is also the only woman in China’s State Council of ten members.[31]
While the share of women in China’s political representative functions ranks comparably high, they largely fall behind in top decision-making functions in China. Is the Chinese dream only a dream of men?
Collection of political voices from China
Why are women – against all efforts to empower them – still overall underrepresented in China’s politics and only share around 8% of China’s most important offices with decision-making power?
Hard facts
Employment trends show that women accounted for ca. 38.8% of the total number of employees in China in 1997; by 2016 the number was supposed to have risen to ca. 43.1%[32]. This is not surprising, considering a gender ratio that counted 120 men on 100 women in 2018. [33]
Soft(-er) facts
To enter the world of work, women are facing a number of conditions that are commonly referred to as discrimination. China Daily quoted Deng Yaping, a former world champion in women’s table tennis at the Olympic Games, “(…) the difference in payment in sports still shows the inequality between women and men.” The news portal added that according to the World Economic Forum in 2015 “(…) it would take 118 years to close the gender gap completely at the current pace”.[34] According to political scientist Song, the income gap in China becomes especially visible in rural areas where women on average earned 56% of the income of men.[35]
Women also face discrimination in certain professions. China’s People’s news recently interviewed an engineer at the huge China Construction Third Engineering Bureau Group, Co., the only female engineer in this whole entity.[36]
Attractiveness of political offices for women in China?
To become a party member in China, a trend has shown that applications from academics have been increasingly favoured over the past 10 years by 15%.[37] This trend not necessarily makes work in political offices more attractive for women.
While the number of female postgraduates in 2016 has for the first time surpassed the number of male graduates with 50.6%[38], stereotypes about women with academic degrees are present in China’s society. The higher the degree, the older the graduates. As marriage during education is not widespread in China, well educated women risk of becoming a ‘leftover woman’(剩女), an mocking expression by China’s society for unmarried women beyond the age of roughly 27.[39] Women in China face high social pressure to candidate for political offices, particularly if they aim to achieve both, having a family to fulfil own dreams plus expectations by the society, as well as to get a high-level position in politics.
One trend in employments for women has been seen in internet businesses:
Women account for 55% of all China’s entrepreneurs in e-business. A solution to find a work-life balance? This trend still shows no outlook for political positions. To risk a career in politics seems additionally unattractive if the overall power of offices in e.g. federations is on decline and top positions are rare. [40]
How is it to enter the Foreign Ministry as a woman?
Excerpt from Zhihu.com (知乎), an open Q&A web portal.
1) Anonymous user, 16 July 2019
Girls are not easy to enter, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) may not be a good choice for girls because: Girls usually join as translators. (…) It is very troublesome to take care of girls, especially when they are sent abroad. (…) To join the MFA means to accept a very difficult process for expatriation for several years without returning home in between. By Chinese traditions, women still focus on a family. To leave parents and a husband behind would not be too good. And even if your husband would agree, you would become a foreigner to your child. If you cannot handle that, do not think about trying this out to. (…) And if you go, you risk to lose face [in society], which could become a problem for your children to study in future. Should you be single, (…), this will make it harder to find a boyfriend. If they would rush to get married, they would think of the above issues. And even if they would agree [to those], their parents probably will not. (…) The MFA is famous for its high divorce and job-hopping rates. (…)
2) Anonymous user, 18 October 2020
Diplomatic work must be stationed abroad, and conditions in many countries are very difficult. Compared with women, men have inherently advantaged physical conditions, which means that men are often more able to endure hardships and thus are more in line with basic conditions of diplomatic work. In a recruitment process of the MFA, if the conditions of the female and male candidates were equal, or the conditions of the woman are slightly better, the male would be preferred. This is not considered gender discrimination. The nature of work determines that the MFA favours men more. (…) In the translation department, there are slightly more women than men. It may be because women have inherent advantages in language learning. (…) [41]
Conclusion
Under the current political leadership in China, the “Dream Baby” girl will have a bumpy road ahead to realize her dreams in a male-dominated society.
This analysis has shown that women in China are in a current situation where on the one hand their empowerment is actively promoted by words, while on the other hand the number of options for women to actively design their lives have been drastically limited by traditions and socio-political developments.
Women in China are subordinated to a political agenda of a new era, a nationalist ideology rooted in Marxism and Maoism with patriarchal Confucianist elements; an ideology created by a male political elite, transferred to a society that now undergoes an extremely fast transformation from decades of Chinese Communism until 1978 over reformations to Neoliberalism until roughly 2013 now into a new era of ‘Socialism with Chinese characteristics’. This transformation politicises and dictates private and public life, aims to fully subordinate interests of the masses to the ruling party and encourages to reinstall traditions in which a women’s political role is rather associated to home- and family work, then to state politics. With rising state power and control in China, once powerful institutions as the ACWF that had promoted and represented women’s rights for decades, have now been overshadowed by a layer of propaganda narratives and state control to first and foremost follow the party’s interest, which has transformed it into a CCP representative body.
Despite all efforts to legally equalise the rights between women and men, top-level decision-making positions in China are rarely occupied by a female leader. In politics, not only conditions for women to join are met by numerous obstacles as to be hindered to get good positions while being a mother, but also the reintroduction of Confucianist values to the society hinder women’s willingness to compete in a male dominated (by number) and male preferred (by tradition) environment.
As China’s government aims no less than to achieve global leadership status until 2049, this development should be of concern to international women’s federations, organisations to protect human rights and to international state governments.
An increased power in global politics by Chinese leaders, unless otherwise dictated by the CCP, will also mean a global export of China’s politics and could influence the power of women worldwide.
The article was first presented at CERIS-ULB Diplomatic School of Brussels, May 26, 2021.
For more information, please contact Cassandra Foresight and its services about China.
Sources:
[1] People.com.cn (人民网), 2017. Dream Baby (梦娃)。[online] http://tj.people.com.cn/GB/375899/380035/380828/index.html [Accessed 24 May 2021].
[2] Buckley, C., 2019. Xi Extols China’s ‘Red’ Heritage in a Land Haunted by Famine Under Mao. [online] The New York Times. Available at: www.nytimes.com/2019/09/30/world/asia/china-mao-zedong-xi-jinping.html [Accessed 25 May 2021].
[3] China Daily, 2021. Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. [online] Available at: http://cpcchina.chinadaily.com.cn/2010-09/16/content_13918113.htm [Accessed 25 May 2021].
[4] Westcott, B., 2018. Socialism with Chinese characteristics? Beijing’s propaganda explained. [online] CNN World. Available at: https://edition.cnn.com/2018/03/10/asia/china-npc-communist-party-phrases-intl/index.html [Accessed 25 May 2021].
[5] See: China.net “One-belt-one-road” net (中国网”一带一路” 网), 2021.[online] Available at: http://ydyl.china.com.cn
[6] The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 2015. “Made in China 2025” Targets and general ideas (orig.: “中国制造2025” 的目标和总体思路). [online] Available at: http://www.scio.gov.cn/32344/32345/32347/20150327/zy32627/Document/1397412/1397412.htm [Accessed on 25 May 2021].
[7] ·”The historical mission of the Chinese President is to build a modern economic structure for China to restore its status as a world power. ((…) 中国国家主席的历史任务是：为恢复世界大国地位的中国，构建现代经济结构).”- Cited from: Xiong, J. (熊 玠), 2016. Xi Jinping: Straight goals for 2049 (orig.: 习近平：目标直指2049年) [online] News Portal of the Chinese Communist Party (中国共产党新闻网). Available at: http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2016/0615/c352498-28447763.html [Accessed 25 May 2021].
[8] As ‘Chinese’, all people with a Chinese nationality registered in China are addressed in this paper. According to its most recent census of 2021, the People’s Republic of China counts 1.41 bn people, of which 48.76% are women, 51.24% are men. China’s census does not know any category for ‘diverse’ gender. 17.95% of Chinese are under 15 years old, 63.35% are between 15-59 years old, 18.7% are above 60 years of age. The average age of retirement in China is 60 years of age for men and 50 years of age for women (with exceptions in special cases). Once in a retirement age, China hardly offers any options for labour, anymore. Retired people in China often depend on support of their offspring and in return often take care of raising grandchildren while their parents are at work. This article does not differentiate between ethnic minorities in China. China counts 56 ethnic groups with the ‘Han’ being the major group with 91.11%
See: National Bureau of Statistics (国家统计局), 2021. Main data of the 7th National Census (第七次全国人口普查主要数据情况). [online] Available at: http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/202105/t20210510_1817176.html [Accessed 25 May 2021]. Also: hualv.com, 2021. Retirement age (退休年龄). [online] hualv.com. Available at: http://www.66law.cn/special/txnl/ [Accessed 25 May 2021].
[9] From 2017-2019, the Communist Party has lost 0.7% of its members under 35 years and saw an increase of 0.7% of members above 60 years of age. To compare this number with China’s highest political decision-making body, the Politburo, the average age of its members is currently 67 years. See: Grünberg, N., 2021. Who is the CCP? China’s Communist Party in infographics. [online] Merics Mercator Institute for China Studies. Available at: https://merics.org/en/short-analysis/who-ccp-chinas-communist-party-infographics [Accessed 25 May 2021]. Also: Wikipedia, 2021. Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party. [online] Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politburo_of_the_Chinese_Communist_Party [Accessed 24 May 2021].
[10] Xue, T., van Stekelenburg, J., Klandermans, B., 2016. Online collective action in China: a new integrated framework. [online] Sociopedia.isa. Available at: https://doi.org/10.1177/205684601661 [Accessed 25 May 2021].
[11] Modern Confucianism practically means that on the one hand, old traditions should be recalled stimulating collective identity, on the other hand old traditions should be avoided and replaced with modern ideology. A paradox situation that not only irritates scientists. Nevertheless, ideologies are taken by Chinese to utilize them whenever suitable, and modern Confucius elements have already increasingly found their ways into today’s societies in China, including communication, social behaviours, and more. See: Chen, D. (陈道贵), 2014. Three levels of modern meanings of Confucianism (孔子之现代意义的三个层面). [online] Guoxuewang (国学网) Available: http://www.guoxue.com/?p=23379 [Accessed: 25 May 2021]. For further reading on paradox elements in Chinese communication: Fang, T., Faure, O., 2010. Chinese communication characteristics: A Yin Yang perspective. International Journal of Intercultural Relations 35 (2011), p. 320-333.
[12] See above p. 2 on the National Census of 2021. It is doubted that the lifted one-child policy could also lead to more childbirth. Conditions after childbirth to return back into a job are often insecure, new offered positions often range below former levels, and entry conditions to jobs have been amended to the extent that much more personal data of women is relevant to employment, such as the status of marriage or number of children. Given this, employers could potentially choose or reject women according to their family status instead of their skills. See: Lin, J. (林嘉), 2017. Current female employment conditions are still harsh (当前女性就业形势依然相当严峻) . [online] China Youth Net (中国青年网). Available at: http://news.youth.cn/jsxw/201704/t20170405_9414368.htm. [Accessed 25 May 2021].
[13] A liberalisation of women in China has first been critically reviewed starting from the intellectual ‘May 4th Movement’ after the end of the last dynasty in China in 1919, then largely been replaced by an order that aimed to equalize rights between women and men with the rise of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1949. One of the female pioneer defenders of women’s rights was Cai Chan, founding member of the All-China Women’s Federation in 1949. Some further milestones of liberalising women from patriarchal domination and lifting them into politics included the Chinese Civil Code of 1930, which entitled women to become a legal heir, the 1954 Constitution according to which equality between men and women was protected, the 1980 Marriage Law of the PRC, which first abandoned forced marriage, introduced property rights resulting from a marriage to women and opened a possibility for women to apply for a divorce, and finally the 1992 Law for the Protection of Women’s Rights. Between 1950-1970, women were gradually included in politics, peaking in the 1982 Constitution that stated that a selection of women cadres was subject to the state government. See: Heuser, R., 2002. Einführung in die chinesische Rechtskultur. IFA, Hamburg. p. 356. See: Leuthner, M., 2003. Frau. Das grosse China-Lexikon. Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt. p.227. See: Guo, X., Zheng, Y., 2008. Women’s Political Participation in China. [online] China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, Nottingham. Available at: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/iaps/documents/cpi/briefings/briefing-34-women-political-participation.pdf [Accessed May 23 2021].
[14] Further reading: Gong, M. (公茂虹), 2013. Mao Zedong’s dream for a new China (毛泽东的新中国梦想). [online] Institute of Ideological and Political Work of the Central Propaganda Department (中宣部思想政治工作研究所). Available at: http://theory.people.com.cn/n/2013/1206/c168825-23769866.html [Accessed 25 May 2021]. Also for Mao Zedong’s thoughts and biography: Meisner, M., 2007. Mao Zedong. Polity Press, Cambridge.
[15] The AWCF is one of the 34 members of the 13th National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC, 中国人民政治协商会议第十三届全国委员会). See: Website of the All-China Women’s Federation (中华全国妇女联合会)，2021. [online] Available at: www.women.org.cn [Accessed 25 May 2021].
[16] Guo, X., Zheng, Y., 2008. Women’s Political Participation in China. [online] China Policy Institute, University of Nottingham, Nottingham. Available at: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/iaps/documents/cpi/briefings/briefing-34-women-political-participation.pdf [Accessed May 23 2021].
[17] Zhou, Y., 2019. “Being a good daughter of the Party?” [online] China Perspectives 2019-2. Available at: http://journals.openedition.org/chinaperspectives/9042 [Accessed 23 May 2021].
[18] Song, S. (宋少鹏), 2015. Women’s rights? We still have to talk about Capitalism and Socialism. (女权？还是要讲讲资本主义和社会主义]. [online] Observer (观察者). Available at: http://www.guancha.cn/songshaopeng/2015_03_06_311232_s.shtml [Accessed 24 May 2021]. Song Shaopeng is Professor for history of the CCP at Renmin University, Beijing, and an opponent of liberalism in China.
[19] Shen, Y. (沈跃跃), 2021. Make good use of red resources and share the story of the Party’s history (用好红色资源讲好党史故事). [online] National Working Committee on Children and Women under the State Council (国务院妇女儿童工作委员会). Available: http://www.nwccw.gov.cn/2021-05/21/content_292593.htm [Accessed 23 May 2021].
[20] Sun, D. (孙代尧), 2021. A new era sparks new ideas, and new ideas lead onto a new journey. (新时代催生新思想 新思想引领新征程). [online] Qstheory.cn (求是网). Available: http://www.qstheory.cn/qshyjx/2021-04/26/c_1127376303.htm [Accessed 18 May 2021].
[21] Ma, Y. (马焱), 2019. On the socialist women’s development path with Chinese characteristics (中国特色社会主义妇女发展道路的特质). [online] Available at: http://theory.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0308/c40531-30964028.html [Accessed 23 May 2021].
[22] Xinhua News, 2021. Xi Jinping visited medical and health education members, who participated in a CPPCC meeting (习近平看望参加政协会议的医药卫生界教育界委员). [online] Available at: www.qstheory.cn/yaowen/2021-03/06/c_1127177762.htm
[Accessed 23 May 2021].
[23] Guo, H. (郭华鸿), 2021. Achieve women’s liberation at a deeper level and promote women’s development at a deeper level. (更深层次实现妇女解放 更大程度促进妇女发展). [online] Xinhua net. Available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2021-03/08/c_1127182844.htm [Accessed 23 May 2021].
[24] Macropolo, 2021. The Committee. [online] Available at: https://macropolo.org/digital-projects/the-committee/ [Accessed 03 April 2021].
[25] Xinhua News Agency, 2018. List of members the 13th Session of the National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (orig.: 中国人民政治协商会议第十三届全国委员会委员名单). [online] Xinhua News Agency. Available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/2018-01/25/c_1122310655.htm [Accessed 24 May 2021].
[26] The National Committee of the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, 2021. Leaders. [online] Available at: http://en.cppcc.gov.cn/leadership.html [Accessed 24 May 2021].
[27] Xinhua News Agency, 2021. List of members of the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (orig.: 中国共产党第19次全国代表大会名单). [online] Xinhua News Agency. Available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/19cpcnc/index.htm [Accessed: 24 May 2021].
[28] Data as by 24 May 2021. The Standing Committee by the 13th National People’s Congress officially counts 175 seats. One member was lost due to bribery, another died, a third resigned, and the status of two further members remains publicly unclear. One of the current vice-chairs is taken by AWCF President Shen Yueyue (沈跃跃). Source: National People’s Congress, 2021. Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress (orig.: 常委会组成人员). [online] The 28thMeeting of the Standing Committee of the 13th National People’s Congress (orig.: 第十三届全国人民代表大会常务委员会第二十八次会议) Available at: http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/d13j28c/13j28c.shtml; data double-checked at: https://baike.baidu.com [Accessed 24 May 2021].
[29] Xinhua, 2021. List of members of the 19th Central Committee of the China Communist Party (中国共产党第十九届中央委员会委员名单). [online] Available: http://cpc.people.com.cn/19th/n1/2017/1024/c414305-29606192.html [Accessed 23 May 2021].
[30] See: Wikipedia, 2021. Politburo of the Chinese Communist Party.
[online] Wikipedia. Available at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politburo_of_the_Chinese_Communist_Party [Accessed 24 May 2021]. See also: Xinhua, 2017. Communiqué of the First Plenary Session of the 19th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (中国共产党第十九届中央委员会第一次全体会议公报).[online] Xinhua News. Available at: http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/19cpcnc/2017-10/25/c_1121853954.htm [Accessed 24 May 2021].
[31] The Central People’s Government of the People’s Republic of China (中华人民共和国中央人民政府), 2021. State Council Leaders (国务院领导). [online] Available at: http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/index.htm [Accessed 24 May 2021].
[32] People’s Daily Online, 2021. Comment les femmes chinoises redéfinissent les rôles des différents sexes sur les lieux de travail. [online] Renminwang. Available at: http://french.people.com.cn/VieSociale/n3/2021/0512/c31360-9849085.html [Accessed 23 May 2021].
[33] Cameron, L. et al., 2018. China’s one-child policy: effects on the sex ratio. [online] GlobalDev. Available at: http://globaldev.blog/blog/china’s-one-child-policy-effects-sex-ratio-and-crime [Accessed 24 May 2021]. The most recent census of 2021 shows a more balanced ratio of 105.07. See also: Xinhua, 2021. Latest census reflects China’s changing demographic landscape. [online] CPC Central Committee Bimonthly. Available at: http://en.qstheory.cn/2021-05/12/c_619955.htm %5BAccessed 12 May 2021].
[34] Zhang, Y., 2016. Empowering women for our future [online] China Daily. Available at: http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-03/04/content_23743589.htm [Accessed 23 May 2021].
[35] Song, S. (宋少鹏), 2015. See footnote 18.
[36] People’s Daily Online, 2021. See footnote 32.
[37] Grünberg, N., 2021. See footnote 9.
[38] Le Petit Journal Shanghai, 2021. DROIT DES FEMMES – Quelle situation pour les Chinoises de l’ère Metoo? [online] Available at: https://lepetitjournal.com/shanghai/comprendre-chine/droit-des-femmes-quelle-situation-pour-les-chinoises-de-lere-metoo-275532 [Accessed: 23 May 2021].
[39] Kuo, L., 2014. In China, highly educated women are mocked as a sexless “third gender”. [online] Quartz. https://qz.com/312464/in-china-highly-educated-women-are-mocked-as-a-sexless-third-gender/ [Accessed 24 May 2021].
[40] Le Petit Journal Shanghai, 2021. See footnote 38.
[41] n.d, 2019/ 2020. How is it to enter the Foreign Ministry as a woman? (女生进外交部怎么样)? [online] Zhihu.com (知乎). Available at: http://www.zhihu.com/question/23221721/answer/43784193 [Accessed 23 May 2021]. Content translated from Chinese.
External readings
- Oct 28, 2021: Clouds over the sky – China says it defends women’s rights. So why attack feminists? The Economist. Available at: https://www.economist.com/leaders/2021/10/28/china-says-it-defends-womens-rights-so-why-attack-feminists
- Jun 03, 2021: Women hold up half the sky, but men rule the party. MERICS. Available at: https://merics.org/en/short-analysis/women-hold-half-sky-men-rule-party